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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Plaintiff Marjorie Ellmaker appeals the district court's granting of Defendant 
Calvin Tabor's motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment on all counts. 
8. Course of the Proceedings 
Marjorie initially filed this action on April 21, 2010 (R., Vol. I, pp. 5-17) and filed 
an Amended Complaint on May 25, 2010. (R., Vol. I, pp. 26-47). Tabor thereafter filed 
his Motion for Summary Judgment (R., Vol. I, pp. 55-57), Motion to Dismiss for Lack of 
Standing (R., Vol. I, pp. 58-60), and related memorandum and affidavit on June 7, 2013 
(R., Vol. I, pp. 61-68). Following briefing by the parties and oral argument thereon held 
on October 24, 2013, the Court issued its Order Granting Defendant Tabor's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on December 27, 2013 and entered Judgment the same day. (R., 
Vol. II, p. 290-301). The Order is divided into a two-pronged ruling, with the first section 
finding that Marjorie does not have standing (R., Vol. II, pp. 293-295), and the second 
section finding that Tabor is entitled to summary judgment on all four counts asserted 
(R., Vol. II, pp. 295-298). On February 7, 2014, Marjorie filed her Appeal. (R., Vol. 11, 
pp. 302-204). 
C. Concise Statement of the Facts 
1. Marjorie's Kinship, Friendship, and Assistance to Martha. 
Sarah Martha Chitwood ("Martha") was a longtime resident of McCall, Idaho 
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who had been a former school teacher and who was well known and adored. (R., Vol. 
II, pp. 175, 258). She was born on and died a widow with no living 
children on July 25, 2007 in Notus, Idaho. (R., Vol. I, pp. 112, 136). Martha's mother 
was Blanche Bessecker (R., Vol. II, p. 136), and her grandfather was James Bessecker 
(R., Vol. 11, p. 246). 
Marjorie Lois Ellmaker ("Marjorie") is a resident of Notus, Idaho (R., Vol. I, p. 
107), and a single woman (R., Vol. I, p. 5) who formerly worked in a bank and has sold 
real estate (R., Vol. 11, p. 219). Marjorie's mother was the granddaughter of James 
Bessecker (R., Vol. 11, pp. 246, 265), making Marjorie and Martha first cousins once 
removed. In addition to a blood relationship, Martha and Marjorie were friends (R., Vol. 
I, p. 5), and Marjorie was also Martha's helper (R., Vol. II, p. 258). 
In 2003, when Martha was 85 years old, the two ladies engaged an elder law and 
estate-planning attorney, Steven Scanlin, to draft a Power of Attorney on behalf of 
Martha (naming Marjorie as Attorney in Fact) and to draft Martha's Will. (R., Vol. I, pp. 
103-104, Vol. II, p. 258). The Power of Attorney gave Marjorie the power of an absolute 
11 11 owner over Martha's assets and liabilities, including the authority to purchase and sell 
I real and personal property, sign written instruments, participate in legal proceedings, 
and nominated Marjorie as guardian of Martha's estate. (R., Vol. I, pp. 107-111 ). In her 
Will, after devising a few tangible items (and her cats) to several friends, Martha directs, 
"I give ... all of the rest, residue, and remainder of my property, real, personal, and 























I ,·,( ,.;) 
Martha also named Marjorie as the Personal Representative for her estate. (R., Vol. I, p. 
112). 
When Martha passed away in 2007, Steven Scanlin drafted an Affidavit of Non-
Probate of the Estate of Sarah Martha Chitwood, transferring real property located in 
McCall, ID to Marjorie, in accordance with the desires set out in Martha's Will. (R., Vol. I, 
pp. 104-105). Steven Scanlin subsequently drafted a second Affidavit of Non-Probate 
of Marjorie Ellmaker ("Non-Probate Affidavit"), transferring to Marjorie the interests 
formerly held by Martha in other personal property, including a promissory note ("the 
Note") on a $150,000 loan to Calvin Tabor ("Tabor") and A 1 Real Estate, LLC ("the 
LLC"). (R., Vol. I, pp. 104-105, 115-116, 120-121 ). Both affidavits were recorded at the 
Valley County Court House. (R., Vol. I, pp. 115, 120). Based on her attorney's advice 
and the recording of these affidavits, despite the absence of a probate court proceeding, 
Marjorie has openly claimed and possessed the real and personal property since the 
death of Martha. (R., Vol. I, p. 70). 
2. Calvin Tabor Helps Martha And Marjorie And Becomes A Friend. 
Two years before she died, in 2005, Martha wanted to sell real property in 
McCall, Idaho but did not want a McCall realtor involved, and Marjorie, who held Power 
of Attorney at that time and was helping Martha with the sale, tracked down someone 
she trusted to assist with the sale, Gary Vizzoso. (R., Vol. I, pp. 7, 28, Vol. II, pp. 138, 
142-145). Gary Vizzoso referred the ladies to Calvin Tabor of Caldwell, Idaho. (R., Vol. 
I, pp. 6, 28). 
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Calvin Tabor ('Tabor"), owner of Tabor Construction (R., Vol. 11, p. 212), and a 
member of the member-managed A1 Real Estate, LLC ("A1") (R., Vol. I, p. 6, Vol. 11, p. 
236) began to spend a lot of time with Martha and Marjorie, gaining the trust of the 
ladies and earning their friendship to the degree where he would later attend Martha's 
funeral. (R., Vol. I, p. 7, Vol. 11, pp. 138,216,221). Upon meeting Martha and Marjorie, 
Tabor began to help them with the sale, including researching and identifying the value 
of the property, contacting and putting together a group of investors to purchase the 
property, and delivering the proposal to the ladies. (R., Vol. I, p. 19, Vol. II, p. 175). 
During the period where Tabor helped Martha and Marjorie sell the McCall 
property, he informed them that he and an unnamed/unidentified business partner 
(Keith Turner), were in the business of purchasing and restoring homes for re-sale. (R., 
Vol. I, pp. 6, 7). Tabor also informed the Marjorie that he in fact was part of the group 
who would purchase and develop Martha's property. (R., Vol. II, p. 138). During closing 
of the McCall sale, Tabor asked Martha in Marjorie's presence if she would be willing to 
lend him and his partner some money for their business. (R., Vol. II, pp. 138, 259). 
Although Tabor protests to the contrary, Marjorie has alleged that neither she nor 
Martha understood the borrower to be a business entity, but rather Tabor and his 
partner. (R., Vol. 11, p. 138). Because she trusted Tabor, Martha would agree to loan 
him the money. (R., Vol. II, p. 138). 
3. Martha's $150,000 Loan to Tabor. 
At some point during the time when Tabor was working with Marjorie and 


























Martha, he had spoken with his partner and together they determined Tabor should ask 
for a $227,000 loan from Martha, in order to continue buying and flipping houses. (R., 
Vol. II, pp. 214-215). As Tabor has acknowledged in deposition, $227,000 is a 
substantial loan, and he made no initial attempt to obtain that loan from a bank because 
his business was a new company and the bank would have wanted to secure the loan 
with assets. (R., Vol. II, p. 217). 
On May 4, 2005, six days before closing on the property, Martha, Marjorie, and 
Tabor signed an Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Real Estate (R., Vol. II, pp. 157-
163) which included and incorporated the terms of Addendum #1 Special Clauses ("the 
Addendum") (R., Vol. II, pp. 164-165). The Addendum provides that Martha will finance 
a portion of the property' sale, and that for $227,000, Martha shall issue two promissory 
notes, one already paid and not at issue here for $77,000 due May 1, 2007, and the ote 
at issue for $150,000 at 6% interest due May 1, 2006. (R., Vol. II, p. 164). These 
paragraphs further require that both notes are to be secured by A 1. (R., Vol. II, p. 164). 
Five days later, on May 9, 2005, Tabor presented Martha with a typed document 
he had either prepared or obtained, titled "Promissory Note" ("the Note"). (R., Vol. 11, pp. 
166-167). Unlike the terms set forth in the Addendum, the Note offered no security for 
the loan. (R., Vol. II, pp. 164, 166). The Note lists the borrower as "A1 Real Estate 
LLC"), bears the initials "C.T." on each page, and at the end of the document is 
executed by "Calvin Tabor as member of A 1 Real Estate." At this time, neither Martha 
and Marjorie, who were 87 and 72 years old respectively (R., Vol. I, p. 119, Vol. II, p. 



















218), had been in the business of loaning large sums of money, nor had either woman 
become familiar with limited liability companies (R., Vol. II, pp. 187-188). Until the 
lawsuit, Marjorie had never heard of limited liability companies. (R., Vol. II, pp. 187-188). 
Yet, despite his relationship with the ladies and his knowledge of their apparent trust in 
him, Tabor, knowing he signed the Note as a member and was borrowing the money 
only as an agent of the LLC, failed to discuss this essential fact. (R., Vol. II, p. 218). 
On that same day, a Seller's Closing Statement was prepared and signed by 
Martha. (R., Vol. 11, p. 252). The closing statement shows that Martha's property was 
sold for $927,000, with a deposit of $65,000, financing via two unsecured notes totaling 
$227,000, and a balance due of $626,118.44. (R., Vol. II, p. 252). Thus far, Tabor has 
not been able to satisfactorily account for the money lent from Martha. (R., Vol. I, p. 20, 
Vol. 11, pp. 214-218). In his Answer, Tabor claimed that Martha's loan was invested in a 
real estate investment that went bad. (R., Vol. I, p. 20). In deposition, Tabor did not 
know if the LLC got actual money as a result of taking out the notes, but claimed that 
the intent behind asking for the loan was to procure operating capital with which to buy 
other properties. (R., Vol. II, p. 215). Further, Tabor could not explain the seller's 
closing statement and why it appeared as if the two notes were given as a portion of the 
purchase price. (R., Vol. II, p. 215). If the LLC had received actual money on these 
notes, Tabor has acknowledged that it should be reflected in a bank deposit statement; 
however, despite requests at deposition and during discovery, no bank statements for 
2005 have been produced. (R., Vol. II, pp. 217-218). 
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The following April 2006, some interest was paid on the Note, and Tabor, 
realizing that neither he nor his business could repay the Note on the following month, 
told Marjorie they must renew; to which and Marjorie agreed and signed as Martha's 
attorney in fact. (R., Vol. I, pp. 8-9, Vol. II, p. 218). The Note's due date was extended 
by handwritten modification to May 1, 2007, a date that passed without further payment 
from Tabor or the LLC. (R., Vol. II, p. 260). But on June 6, 2007, Tabor again 
negotiated the defaulted Note (R., Vol. II, p. 220), and extended the Note's due date via 
a replacement promissory note until December 25, 2007. (R., Vol. II, p. 261 ). 
After Martha's death, and the Note's second default, Marjorie hired Tabor to 
provide cleaning and repair for her home in Notus after it flooded in Spring 2008. (R., 
Vol. I, p. 10, Vol. 11, p. 189). On numerous occasions at her home, Tabor reaffirmed that 
he owed the debt to Marjorie; but he later told her that his partner had told him not to 
repay, although he nonetheless he told her that he would pay her, but it might take time. 
(R., Vol. I, p. 10). During the several occasions when Marjorie met with Tabor and he 
reaffirmed the debt, Marjorie postponed bringing legal action because of his 
reassurances to repay. (R., Vol. II, p. 261 ). 
By fall or early winter 2008, the Note remaining unpaid, Marjorie, attempting to 
mitigate the situation, asked Tabor if he would perform remodel work on the property 
she inherited from Martha in order to work off his debt. (R., Vol. I, p. 10). Tabor 
contacted either an architect or designer, began to get bids from sub-contractors, and 
spoke to a father-son team already working on the house about helping Tabor later on 

















during the remodel. (R., Vol. II, p. 222). In July 2009, Marjorie and Tabor had a meeting 
set up to discuss bids Tabor had received, but Tabor skipped the meeting and stopped 
communicating with Marjorie. (R., Vol. I, p. 11). Marjorie mailed demand letters to the 
defendants on September 20, 2009, November 5, 2009 (Tabor responded and denied 
the debt was in his name or personally guaranteed by him), and February 8, 2010. (R., 
Vol. I, p. 11). 
A 1 was administratively dissolved June 5, 2008 for failure to file an annual report. 
(R., Vol. II, pp. 220, 241, 261). 
4. Administrative Practices of A 1 Real Estate, LLC, Tabor's 
Management Role and A1's Tax Records. 
A 1 was formed March 19, 2004 by Keith Turner and Calvin Tabor as 
members. (R., Vol. 11, p. 236), and it was in the business of buying and fixing up houses 
and land to resell for profit (R., Vol. 11, p. 175). Prior to forming A1, in January 2001 
Tabor had formed another limited liability company, Perks Company, LLC, which was 
administratively dissolved the month before A1 formed. (R., Vol. II, p. 223). Tabor 
organized another limited liability company, Central Park LLC (R., Vol. II, p. 227), 
signing and filing the paperwork on December 4, 2007. Additionally, Tabor has a 
separate business entity, MNT Incorporated, involving a plane in which he owns a one-
third interest (R., Vol. II, p. 214) and a pilot who gives flying lessons, and this business 
appears to offer the limitations on liability provided by corporate structure. (R., Vol. II, p. 






















212). During his deposition, Tabor lacked recollection of his involvement with any 
limited liabilitycompanyotherthanA1. (R., Vol. II, p. 212) 
Tabor testified that when he and Turner created A 1, he understood that the 
purpose of choosing that form of organization was the personal protection it would offer 
him. (R., Vol. II, p. 212). Tabor took the time to research limited liability companies and 
become educated about them. (R., Vol. II, p. 213). In deposition he agreed that it was 
probably true that when he selected the limited liability form for A 1, one of his thoughts 
,,vas to protect his own assets should the business fail. (R., Vol. 11, p. 213). Despite his 
superior knowledge on the subject of limited liability companies, and despite being 
placed in a position of trust where he was helping another elderly lady sell her property, 
Tabor avoided any discussion with Martha or Marjorie concerning their familiarity or lack 
thereof regarding limited liability companies or the risk of making an unsecured loan to 
such (R. Vol. I, p. 19, Vol. II, pp. 259-260). 
While Tabor managed the construction aspect for the LLC, Turner managed the 
finances (R., Vol. 11, p. 176), bookwork and papers, got a real estate license, and did the 
research involved with buying and selling homes (R., Vol. 11, p. 212). Turner filed the 
Secretary of State paperwork organizing the LLC (R., Vol. 11, p. 212), engaged a CPA to 
file the LLC's tax returns (R., Vol. I, p. 176), and appears to have kept possession and 
control of at least some of the LLC's financial records (R., Vol. II, pp. 217-218). The 
record implies that aside from. construction and remodel work, Tabor's only other activity 
for A 1 was the negotiation and procurement of the loan from Martha, and negotiation for 





















its subsequent extensions - activities that appear to be out of character given the 
general division of labor in the enterprise. Tabor did not recall who appeared to 
represent the LLC at the closing of the McCall purchase, and his testimony suggests 
that while he handled the initial phase of offer and agreement for the loan, his 
involvement did not extend to the particulars of the transaction and what was actually 
exchanged between Martha and the LLC (R., Vol. II, pp. 215-217). 
Tabor's lack knowledge or memory regarding the LLC's operations, transactions, 
solvency, and history is reflected throughout his testimony. (R., Vol. 11, pp. 212-222). He 
could not recall whose idea it was to form the LLC as opposed to a partnership (R., Vol. 
II, p. 212), the first property purchase made by the LLC (R., Vol. II. p. 213), the specifics 
on any property purchased with the loan from Martha (R., Vol. 11, p. 215), details of, or 
witnesses to, his discussions with Turner about borrowing the loan (R., Vol. II, p. 216), 
or the money or credit available to the LLC with which to buy houses (R., Vol. II, p. 219). 
He claimed to be unaware of the business situation prior to the LL C's first administrative 
dissolution in 2007 (R., Vol. 11, p. 220), did not discuss preventative practices with his 
partner to avoid a subsequent administrative dissolution (R., Vol. II, p. 221), did not talk 
to his partner about, nor know how his partner chose, how to handle the LLC's creditors 
at the 2008 dissolution (R., Vol. II, p. 221). 
Although these documents are not part of the record (despite counsel's attempts 
to initially procure as part of the discovery related documents and subsequently request 
at Tabor's deposition) it appears that A 1 had a substantial amount of documents 




















pertaining to its financial dealings, including time books, billing records and receipts (R., 
Vol. II, p. 212), bank statements going back to at least 2005 (R., Vol. 11, p. 217), and the 
buyer's closing statement from the McCall purchase (R., Vol. II, p. 218). Additionally, 
the LLC has journal entries, general ledgers, and bank account transaction statements 
mentioned in the CPA Gregory Braun's October 2013 letter to Turner. (R., Vol. II, p. 
255). Tabor has produced bank statements from 2006-2008, but none for 2005 (R., 
Vol. 11, p. 217), and tax records for 2008 alone (R., Vol. 11, pp. 202-210). 
From the narrow picture presented in the financial documents produced by 
Tabor, it appears that the LLC did not always behave according to its traditionally 
recognized form, as it disregarded its corporate structure for federal tax purposes, 
electing instead to identify itself as, and be treated as, a domestic general partnership 
(R., Vol. II, pp. 203, 205, 207). Nor did all of the LLC's activities fall within the ordinary 
course of its home-flipping business, such as when it made a non-business loan to Jeff 
Gardner by borrowing on its business's line of credit (R., Vol. II, pp. 249,281) when it 
was not in the business of loaning out money (R., Vol. 11, p. 222). 
The loan from the LLC to Jeff Gardner is recorded on a promissory note almost 
identical to the Note at issue here. (R., Vol. II, pp. 180-181). The terms of the loan 
require payment of the $50,000 principal, plus a 10% fee, on or before July 5, 2007. 
(R., Vol. 11, p. 180). It was drafted on June 5, 2007, and signed by Gardner on June 6, 
2007, which, coincidentally, is the same day that Tabor signed the replacement note 
extending the due date on the loan until December 25, 2007. (R., Vol. II, pp. 168-169, 




















180-181). Although Tabor initially denied recollection of the LLC's loan to a third party 
and that third party's subsequent bankruptcy filing, he recovered a portion of his 
memory upon further questioning (that he went to the bankruptcy proceeding) at his 
April 2013 deposition (R., Vol. II, p. 222), and then fully recollected the details in his 
November 2013 Affidavit (R., Vol. II, pp. 176-177). 
The $50,000 June 6, 2007 loan to Gardner appears in the LLC's 2008 tax record. 
(R., Vol. 11, p. 208). The record indicates that the loan was acquired on December 31, 
2007, sold on December 31, 2008, and cost was $58,432. (R., Vol. II, p. 208). 
The 2008 tax records also show that the LLC made distributions to Tabor and 
Turner (R., Vol. II, pp. 205-206, 209-210), although Tabor's Affidavit and a letter from 
CPA Gregory Braun attempt to clarify that the distributions shown were actually how the 
company converted outstanding debts to paper "income". (R., Vol. II, pp. 182-183, 250). 
Tabor's Affidavit admits that the LLC did pay back its internal creditors (himself) a 
$100,000 loan, in addition to disbursing payroll funds to Tabor. (R., Vol. II, p. 250). 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court erred when determining that Marjorie 
Ellmaker lacks standing to sue on the unpaid note where Martha's will was never 
probated? 
2. Whether the district court erred when granting Tabor's Motion for 




















Summary Judgment on all counts of the Complaint where Tabor's signature on the note 
indicates he was agent for A 1 Real Estate? 
3. Whether Marjorie should be awarded attorney fees, should she prevail, 
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41? 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Motion to Dismiss - In reviewing a trial court's order granting a motion to 
dismiss, this Court's standard of review is the same as its summary judgment standard. 
Hagy v. State of Idaho, 137 Idaho 618, 621 (Ct. App. 2002); Rim View Trout Co. v. 
Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 119 Idaho 676, 677 (1991). The standard of review on 
appeal from an order granting summary judgment is the same standard that is used by 
the district court in ruling on the motion. Gibson v. Ada County, 142 Idaho 746, 751 
(2006); Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 170 (2000). 
Motion for Summary Judgment - Appeals from an order of summary judgment 
are reviewed de novo. Curlee v. Kootenai Cnty. Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 394 
(2008) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Under this standard, "disputed facts 
are construed in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can 
be drawn from the record are drawn in favor of the non-moving party." Curlee, 148 
Idaho at 394. The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether 
the party is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Taylor v. McNichols, 149 
Idaho 826, 832 (2010) (quoting Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672-73 (2008). 
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The motion must be denied if the evidence is such that conflicting inferences may be 
drawn therefrom and it reasonable people might reach different conclusions. Pro 
lndiviso v. Mid-Mile Holding, 131 Idaho 741, 745 (1998); Farmers National Bank v. 
Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 67-68 (1994). 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Erred in Dismissing Marjorie Ellmaker's Complaint 
Because She Has A Legally Protectable Interest In The Note And Therefore 
Has Standing To Sue On Its Default. 
Standing is a preliminary question to be determined by the Court before reaching 
the merits of the case. Miles v. Idaho Power, 116 Idaho 635, 637 (1989); Young v. City 
of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104 (2002). This Court has noted that the doctrine of 
standing is imprecise and difficult to apply. Miles, 116 Idaho at 641. 
In Miles v. Idaho Power Co., this Court stated three basic propositions 
concerning standing: (1) [t]he doctrine of standing focuses on the party seeking relief 
and not on the issues the party wishes to have adjudicated; (2) to satisfy the case or 
controversy requirement of standing, litigants generally must allege or demonstrate an 
injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or 
redress the claimed injury; (3) a citizen and taxpayer may not challenge a governmental 
enactment where the injury is one suffered alike by all citizens and taxpayers of the 
jurisdiction. Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary County, 128 Idaho 371, 375 (1996) 
(quoting Miles, 116 Idaho 635, 641 (1989)) (internal quotations omitted); Thomson v. 


















City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 476-77 (2002); In re Jerome County Bd. Of Com'rs, 
153 Idaho 298, 281 (2012) 
1. lniury In Fact 
The first element of standing, injury in fact, has been defined as "an invasion 
of a legally-protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or 
imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical'." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555, 560 (1992) (citations and internal quotations omitted). This type of required 
interest has also been termed a "judicially cognizable interest" and a "distinct palpable 
injury." In re Jerome County Bd. Of Com'rs, at 1086; Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 
Idaho 102, 104 (2002). 
In Lujan, the U.S. Supreme Court restated a ruling that the desire to use or 
observe animal species, even for purely aesthetic purposes was undeniably a 
cognizable interest for purpose of standing. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562. This court has also 
recognized that standing may be predicated on intangible, nonmonetary interests, such 
as the maintenance of recreational and aesthetic value (In re Jerome County Bd. Of 
Com'rs, at 1086), in addition to protection of property or ownership interests and 
pecuniary interests (Ashton Urban Renewal Agency v. Ashton Mem'I, Inc., 155 Idaho 
309 (Idaho 2013)). 
In Ashton Urban Renewal Agency, the respondent, Ashton Memorial, a business 
providing care and nursing facilities, alleged lack of standing in the Ashton Urban 
Renewal Agency's (AURA) challenge to the Idaho Board of Tax Appeal's (BTA) 




















determination of respondent's tax exemption status. Ashton Memorial held real and 
personal property located within AURA's geographical revenue allocation area that 
would have provided AURA with an additional $43,477 in revenue collected for fiscal 
year 2011, but for the BTA's grant of tax exemption. Ashton Memorial argued that 
AURA lacked standing because it only possessed a property interest in taxes that were 
"actually levied" and thus could not appeal the taxing authority's decision on the 
grounds that it was deprived of "expected funds." Id. 
This court rejected respondent's argument, stating that it amounted to the claim 
that, to have standing, AURA must have already acquired the property or be entitled to 
it by statute. Id. at 733. Instead, the court determined that its precedent did not require 
such a high standard for establishing standing to appeal decisions by the County Board 
of equalization. Id. Rather, AURA needed only to show a pecuniary interest, and the 
loss of $43,477 to its revenue stream amounted to a real and concrete loss. Id. 
Standing does not require that a party prove its case before the commencement 
of trial. Pro lndiviso v. Mid-Mile Holding, 131 Idaho 741, 746 (1998). In Pro lndiviso, 
appellants Dean and Betty Bowles argued that plaintiff-respondent Pro lndiviso did not 
have standing to bring an action for ejectment after it purchased property at a tax sale 
which the Bowles had previously conveyed into trust. The Bowles contended that Pro 
lndiviso could not prove its ownership as it had not quieted titled on the contested 
property. The court disagreed. Id. 




















Noting that Pro lndiviso did present evidence that it possessed a deed granted by 
the I.R.S., the Court said, "[t]o require every land owner who wants to eject someone 
from their property to first prove ownership through a quiet title action would be 
unreasonable and go beyond the requirements of standing." Id. at 747. 
In its Order in this case, the district court found it persuasive that Martha's will 
was not probated, and thereby determined Marjorie lacked standing to bring this lawsuit, 
as "there was no evidence in the record ... [of Plaintiff's] ... ownership of the 
promissory note and a right to pursue a claim in her own name. (R., Vol. 11, p. 295). 
Additionally, the district court stated, "Plaintiff has offered no explanation as to why the 
will was not probated." (R., Vol. II, p. 295). 
This finding fails to take into account significant portions of the record that do 
provide explanation as to why the will was not probated (R., Vol. I, pp. 70, 75-76 p. 28 
In. 1 top. 31 In. 6, 104-105, Vol. 11, 139-140, 267) and fails to acknowledge Marjorie's 
pecuniary, if not property, interest in the note as an intestate heir to Martha's estate. 
Here, Marjorie has alleged that she is a blood relative of Martha; she is Martha's 
first cousin once removed. 1 (R., Vol. II, p. 265). Even if one must assume, for the 
purpose of argument, that Martha's will is invalid and Marjorie cannot receive property 
from the estate by way of devise, the Defendant has not produced one iota of evidence 
1 The district court initially characterized Marjorie as Martha's "friend" and later 
bypassed discussion of Marjorie's position as a collateral heir and corresponding 
interest in Martha's estate under Idaho's intestacy statutes. 




















to defeat the claim that Marjorie is eligible to inherit from Martha's estate under Idaho's 
intestacy statutes. 
Like the appellants in Pro lndiviso, and the respondent in Ashton Memorial, 
Defendant would have the Court believe that standing requires entitlement to property, 
and force Marjorie to prove her ownership interest in that property before she is allowed 
to bring an action on the promissory note. This is not the case. As either residuary 
beneficiary under the will or intestate heir, Marjorie, similar to the petitioner in Ashton 
Urban Renewal Agency who faced a loss in revenue stream, can show a distinct 
palpable injury in light of the loss of $170,096.49 to Martha's estate due to nonpayment 
of the note. (R., Vol. I, p. 11) 
Because Marjorie has provided evidence that she possesses a legally protected 
interest that has been economically harmed, she can satisfy the first element of injury in 
fact. 
2. Causation 
Causation, the second element of standing, requires a fairly traceable causal 
connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct. Young, 137 Idaho 
102, 104 (2002); Miles, 116 Idaho 635,639 (1989). Although not precedent in this 
Court, in the Ninth Circuit, the burden of proving causation has been stated thus, "the 
'reasonable probability' of the challenged action's threat to [plaintiff's] concrete interest." 
Idaho Conservation League v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 2:12-CV-00004-RE, at 8 (D. 
Idaho. March 10, 2014) (quoting Hall v. Norton, 266 F.3d 969, 977 (9th Cir. 2001); see 



















also Center for Food Safety v. Vi/sack, 636 F.3d 1166, 1171-72 (9th Cir. 2011 ). 
Causation does not need to be established with the degree of certainty that would be 
required for ... [success] on the merits ... of a tort claim. Idaho Conservation League, 
at 8. 
In the present action, Defendant Tabor has acknowledged that he first became 
connected with Martha and Marjorie because they were looking for someone to help 
them sell property. (R., Vol. I, p. 19). Marjorie testified that were specifically looking for 
a realtor outside the McCall area. (R., Vol. 11, p. 138). Defendant Tabor has 
acknowledged that Marjorie appeared to trust him, and that he was the one who 
presented the idea the ladies that a loan be provided to finance the purchase of the 
property on or very near the time of closing. (R., Vol. II, p. 222, Tabor Deposition p. 
102, In 7-8). Marjorie has testified she and Martha placed their trust and confidence in 
Tabor, that they were unfamiliar with Tabor's partner (did not even know his name or 
that he was a real estate agent (R., Vol. II, p. 138)), and that it was the position of trust 
and friendship they felt they had with Tabor that led to the agreement to make a 
$150,000 unsecured loan (R., Vol. II, pp. 188-189). 
Likewise, Marjorie has presented evidence that while she and Martha believed 
Tabor was helping them with the sale, Tabor knew that he was essentially acting as a 
self-dealing agent, as he testified that when he signed the note, he knew that he was 
acting as an agent for a limited liability company, and he failed to discuss that with the 
85 year-old Martha and 72 year-old Marjorie. (R., Vol. 11, p, 218, Tabor Deposition p. 
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88., In. 7-19). As far as Martha and Marjorie were concerned, Tabor was A1. (R., Vol. 
II, p. 189). Tabor was the driving force between the genesis of Martha's loan and A1's 
debt. Tabor negotiated the original note (R., Vol. II, p. 216, Tabor Deposition p. 63, In. 
8-18), then negotiated the renewal note when it became clear that the first note would 
likely default (R., Vol. II, p. 218, Tabor Deposition p. 89, In. 6-15), and again negotiated 
the extension of the due date for the second note (R., Vol. 11, p. 220, Tabor Deposition 
p. 95, In. 4-13). 
To find that Tabor is a necessary component of the harm to Martha's estate and 
Marjorie's injury is not to make a too attenuated stretch. There is sufficient evidence in 
the record demonstrating that but for Tabor and his relationship with Martha and 
Marjorie, the loan would not have been made. Moreover, but for Tabor's negotiations 
and finally his subsequent agreement to pay back the loan, a lawsuit would likely have 
been filed before A 1 became insolvent. 
Thus, the entirety of Tabor's conduct alleged in the pleadings, motions, and 
exhibits, displays a readily identifiable connection between the Defendant and Marjorie's 
injury. 
3. Red ressa b ility 
The final element of redressability looks at whether "there is a substantial 
likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury." 
Boundary Backpackers, 128 Idaho at 375; Miles, 116 Idaho at 641; In re Jerome County 
Bd. Of Com'rs, 281 P .3d at 1086. 





















Here, the claimed injury is the nonpayment of the note by Calvin Tabor and his 
business A1 Real Estate. (R., Vol. I, p. 11). Both Tabor and A1 are parties to this action 
and will be bound by the district court's judgment. (R., Vol. I, p. 6). Hence, the district 
court is free to fashion relief against both parties in a manner that will certainly redress 
the claimed injury. 
On the whole, the evidence in the record confirms that Marjorie Ellmaker is a 
proper plaintiff to bring this action, and the district court erred when it found she lacked 
standing. Therefore, this Court should reverse the district court's dismissal. 
B. The District Court Erred In Granting Summary Judgment Because It 
Failed To Construe Disputed Facts In Marjorie's Favor. 
Tabor's summary judgment motion on each count was based on the argument 
that the $150,000 loan was not to him and that he did not personally guarantee payment 
by A 1. The District Court ruled that even if Marjorie established her standing, it would 
grant Mr. Tabor's Motion for Summary Judgment on all four counts. (R., Vol. 11, p. 295.) 
Marjorie L. Ellmaker respectfully disagrees and contends that she pied and established 
sufficient facts to create factual issues as to each count alleged in her complaint and 
each theory of relief. 
1. Count I -Oral Contract. The District Court erred when it found there 
was no valid oral agreement by Tabor to pay back the loan. 
Marjorie alleges that Tabor is responsible to repay the $150,000. In its Order, the 
court only addressed the time period when the Note was past due. The court did not 
explicitly determine that there were no factual issues. The court ruled that Marjorie did 














not have a valid legal claim against Tabor and therefore, there was no consideration for 
her to put off a claim against him. (R., Vol. II, pp. 295, 296.) The ruling implies that there 
was no valid oral agreement requiring Tabor to pay the loan and that there is no 
possible cause of action that Marjorie gave up or delayed. The other side of this coin is 
that if there was any potential valid claim, then there was consideration. 
Initially, the burden of showing a want of consideration sufficient to support an 
instrument lies with the party seeking to invalidate or avoid it. I. C. § 29-104. Some 
consideration must be provided; but, with some exceptions the court will not examine 
whether it is adequate. See, e.g., Boise Tower Assocs., LLC v. Hogland, 147 Idaho 774, 
780 (2009). See also, Quayle v. Mackert, 92 Idaho 563 (1968); (Courts will not inquire 
into the adequacy or sufficiency of consideration, except as it might reflect on a party's 
competence or consciousness of action.) 
Consideration will have passed between them if Marjorie suffered any loss, or 
Tabor received any gain, "however trifling." Mickelsen Construction, Inc., v. Horrocks, 
154 Idaho 398, 402, 403 (2013) quoting, Vincent v. Larson, 1 Idaho 241, 248 (1869). 
The Court cites Vincent approval, 
"To constitute a consideration it is not absolutely necessary that a 
benefit should accrue to the person making the promise. It is 
sufficient that something valuable flows from the person to whom it 
is made; and that the promise is the inducement to the transaction." 
Violett v. Patton, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 142, 150, 3 L.Ed. 61 (1809). Marjorie has claimed 
that Tabor agreed pay the loan. See, I. C. §9-506(2). When Tabor first defaulted, 



















Marjorie did not bring an action because of Tabor's promises to pay, and because his 
actions were consistent with his words. Regardless, Marjorie had other grounds to bring 
a suit that included, claims against Tabor, Turner, A1, or any combination of them: (1) 
for mistake, misrepresentation or fraud, reformation, rescission, or unjust enrichment; 
and (2) for enforcement of valid agreements between the defendants and Martha (and 
later Marjorie). She also had the ability to file a lien against the McCall property to the 
extent of the loan and A 1 's interest in it. Had Marjorie filed a lawsuit against A 1, then A 1 
and Tabor's assets would have been affected. 
Because there was consideration based on valid potential claims, the district 
court should not have granted summary judgment on Count I. Moreover, there is a 
factual dispute whether Tabor agreed to pay the Note from May, 2005 until shortly 
before this suit was filed in 2010. 
There is a factual dispute, therefore a jury issue, whether Tabor agreed to pay 
the debt. That was a basis of the request for relief. The oral contract alleged in Count I 
was formed when Martha agreed to loan him money on May 5, 2005. Tabor reaffirmed 
that he was responsible for the debt many times between May 2005 and July 2009. 
Tabor's position is that the purchase and sale agreement and Note control the 
loan agreement, that the loan was to A 1, and thus A 1 is responsible for repayment. The 
purchase and sale agreement and the Note was provided by Tabor at the closing. 
Marjorie acknowledges that the Purchase and Sale Agreement and the Notes are in the 


















name of A 1. But, neither the Purchase and Sale Agreement, nor the Note(s) were 
necessary for the loan. 
Formation of a contract is generally a question of fact for the trier of fact to 
resolve. Inland Title Co. v. Comstock, 116 Idaho 701, 702 (1989). A valid contract 
requires that there be a meeting of the minds as evidenced by a manifestation of mutual 
intent to contract. P.O. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 
233, 238 (2007). In a dispute over contract formation, the [party attempting to establish 
an enforceable agreement]2 has to prove a distinct and common understanding 
between the parties. Id.; Inland Title Co. v. Comstock, 116 Idaho 701 (1989). The 
essential terms of a contract include the parties to the contract, the subject matter 
thereof, the price or consideration, a description of the property and all the essential 
terms and conditions of the agreement. Hoffman v. SV Co., Inc., 102 Idaho 187 (1981) 
(citations omitted). 
"It is true that one party to a contract cannot alter its terms without the assent of 
the other and that the minds of the parties must meet as to any proposed modification. 
[However the] fact of agreement may be implied from a course of conduct in 
accordance with its existence and assent may be implied from the acts of one party in 
2 The word replaced by the bracketed phrase is "plaintiff." The language comes from the 
case, Johnson v Albert, 67 Idaho 44 (1946). Johnson involved a dispute over contract 
formation, where the plaintiff was trying to prove the existence of a valid contract to 
deed her a home. Here Marjorie is trying to prove that there was an agreement; but the 
parties to the agreement are not set out in the writing. 









accordance with the terms of the change proposed by the other." Scott v. Castle, 104 
Idaho 719 (Ct. App.1983). 
Marjorie acknowledges that the Agreement and the Note support Tabor's 
position when they are isolated from the relationship and trust between Tabor and 
Martha and Marjorie. However, the Court needs to consider that without the relationship 
and the trust, there would be no loan. The following facts show Tabor's "course of 
conduct" allowing a fact-finder to determine the agreement's existence and Tabor's 
assent. 
Tabor asked Martha for two loans totaling $227,000.00 on May 4, 2005, days 
before the closing took place on Martha's McCall property. (R., Vol. 11, p. 138 (,r7); and 
R. Vol. II, pp. 199, 199A (1l 9); and R. Vol. 11, p. 214 (Tr. p. 69, Lns. 11 - 21).) The 
alleged purpose of the loans was to help him and his partner (R., Vol. 11, p. 138, (118).) 
Tabor never identified his partner. (R., Vol. II, p. 138, (119).) Because of Martha and 
Marjorie's relationship with, and trust in Tabor, Martha intended to make the loans to 
Tabor, or Tabor and his partner. (R., Vol. II, p. 138 (1l116 and 7); and R. Vol. II, p. 188 
(115).) In either case, Tabor's overall words and actions were clear from May 2005 
through July 2009, that he, not A 1, was the responsible. 
Marjorie stated that "Martha agreed to loan Tabor the money because she 
trusted Tabor based on the relationship that he had developed with us." (R., Vol. II, p. 
189 (117).) This trust extended to the point Marjorie expected that he would have told 
her and Martha about the "significance and dangers of loaning [money] to an LLC," or at 
















least recommend that they consult a lawyer. (R., Vol. II, p. 188 (1f5)) She said that their 
trust in Tabor allowed them to be deceived about "who the loan was to .... " (R., Vol. II, p. 
189 (1f7) In other words, they trusted that Tabor would have let them know that A 1 was 
a separate entity, like a corporation, and that it was not a general partnership. In fact, 
Marjorie and Martha believed that there was no difference between "Calvin Tabor and 
A1 Real Estate LLC." (R., Vol. II, p. 189 (1f6)) 
Even though Tabor attempted to minimize the relationship during his deposition 
(R., Vol. 11, p. 216 (Tr. p. 62, Lns. 5 - 17).), the size of the loan he requested and 
received, and the terms show how much trust he had developed between himself and 
Martha and Marjorie. Tabor's knowledge of the size of the loans, and that he would not 
get a loan like this from a bank, and the lack of a writing committing himself to personal 
liability, support the argument that Tabor was aware of, and took advantage of, Martha 
and Marjorie. Further, he asked Martha for the loan at a time when he had "arranged for 
a large amount of money to be transferred to Martha; [and they] were pleased and 
happy with what he had done and how the sale had worked out and had no reason to 
distrust" him. (R., Vol. 11, p. 188 (1f5)) He likely knew. 
The first time that Tabor said that the loan was not his was four years after the 
closing. (R., Vol. II, p. 189 (1f8)) Marjorie had a number of conversations with Tabor 
where he told her "not to worry that he (not someone else) would pay back the loan." 
(R., Vol. 11, p. 189 (1f8)). In Spring 2008 when Tabor came to work at Marjorie's home, 
they discussed the debt "almost every time." (R., Vol. II, pp. 189, 190 (1f9)). Tabor had 



















many opportunities to tell Marjorie that the debt was not his; he did not. This acted to 
Marjorie's detriment as she would have filed an action sooner, when A 1 still had assets. 
(R., Vol. 11, p. 190 (1J9)). In the fall of 2008, Tabor told Marjorie that he had the money to 
pay the debt, but was concerned that his partner would use the money if he put it in the 
bank. Marjorie suggested a plan that would help avoid that problem. Her plan was not 
followed and the Jeff Gardner loan ensued. (R., Vol. II, p. 190 (1J1J10 and 11)). 
Some of Tabor's post default statements to Marjorie reassured her that he was 
trustworthy and would pay her back. For example, in the winter of 2008/2009, Tabor told 
[Marjorie] that he had spoken to his partner about his need to repay the loan and his 
partner told him to simply declare bankruptcy; Tabor told Marjorie that he told his 
partner, 'You do not know her like I do, I can't do that...;' he also told her much about his 
family. (R., Vol. 11, p. 191 (1J12)). Another example of reassurance occurred just before 
Tabor stopped communicating with Marjorie. In 2009, Marjorie asked Tabor if he would 
consider working off part of the debt by working on the restoration of the McCall home 
that [Marjorie] inherited from Martha; Mr. Tabor told [her] that he had been thinking the 
same thing. (R., Vol. II, p. 191 (1J15)). 
Even assuming the loans were to A1, Tabor promised Marjorie that he would pay 
back the debt. Tabor's promise to Marjorie is an original promise and an oral agreement 
that is an exception to the Statute of Frauds. I. C. § 9-506. In Dalby v. Kennedy, 94 
Idaho 72 (1971 ), the court held that a shareholder who told a creditor of the corporation 
that he would pay the original corporate account became obligated to pay that account 



















as an original obligation under§ 9-506. The Court also held that, whether an oral 
promise constitutes a collateral or an original obligation, for the purposes of the statute 
of frauds, is generally a question for the finder of fact. Dalby v. Kennedy, 94 Idaho 72 
(1971). See also, Wright v. Wright, 97 Idaho 439 (1976); see also, M. T. Deaton & Co. v. 
Leibrock, 114 Idaho 614 (Ct. App. 1988). 
Here there is evidence that both before and after the note was in default, Mr. 
Tabor orally agreed that he was responsible for the debt and would pay it. (R., Vol. 11, 
pp. 189, 190 m1l8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 15)). At the very least, whether Tabor, by his 
words and acts, agreed to pay the debt creates an issue of fact for a jury. Thus, the 
District Court erred in granting summary judgment on Count I. 
2. Count II - Good Faith and Fair Dealing. There Is A Factual Issue 
Whether Tabor, As A1's Manager, Acted In Good Faith And Fair 
Dealing In Obtaining And Repaying The Loan. 
Tabor as a manager of A 1, had "the right and authority to manage the affairs of 
the limited liability company and to make all decisions with respect thereto." I. C. § 53-
621.3 The district court found that Marjorie failed to show facts that support her Count II 
claim that Tabor violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (covenant 
of good faith) underlying all contracts. It determined that Marjorie's Count II claim was 
only based on Tabor's "fraud or undue influence" in the formation of the Note - not in 
the course of fulfilling the contract terms. (R., Vol. 11, p. 296). Further, the district court 
3 The former statute is cited throughout this brief because it was in effect during the 
active life of A1 Real Estate. 
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mistakenly found that Marjorie did not provide any authority for her proposition that 
Tabor had a duty to notify Martha (and Marjorie) that he would not be personally 
responsible for the $150,000.00 loan. (R., Vol. II, p. 296). In fairness to the District 
Court, the brief written in opposition to summary judgment is confusing. The argument 
regarding the covenant of good faith follows a series of arguments based on an agency 
theory. (R., Vol. II, pp. 270-274). However, the brief pointed out that Tabor failed "to act 
in good faith as a member-manager of A 1 Real Estate by allowing it to ignore its debt to 
Martha and Marjorie and loan money for non-business purposes and allowing 
distributions after the debt was due." (R., Vol. II, p.280-281). 
Tabor did not perform his obligations in good faith. "The implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing is a covenant implied by law in the parties' contract." Idaho Power 
Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 750 (2000) (other citations omitted). "The 
covenant requires that the parties perform, in good faith, the obligations imposed by 
their agreement. ... " Id. 
Assuming that the contract was between Martha and then Marjorie, and A 1, 
Tabor, as A1's member-manager (R., Vol. II, pp. 236-240) was obliged to manage the 
LLC in a manner that demonstrated his good faith towards repaying the loan. There are 
disputed facts as to whether Tabor performed contractual obligations in good faith. 
The first series of facts demonstrating Tabor's violation were discussed in length 
above. These are the number of times and the circumstances that Tabor told Marjorie 
the debt was his, for her to not worry about it, and that he would make sure it was paid. 



















If the debt was A 1 's, then was obliged to be honest to Marjorie. Rather than disguise 
and shield the debtor until it had no assets, he should have told her that A 1 was 
responsible to repay the loan. Because of his mendacity, Marjorie missed an 
opportunity to bring a collection action against A 1 when it had assets. 
The second series of facts demonstrating Tabor's violation, surround his 
obligations, actions, and lack of action or communications, as an experienced LLC 
manager. A 1 appears to be one of three member-managed LLCs of which Tabor was a 
member-manager between 2001 and 2013. (R., Vol. pp. 224-243). Tabor had formed 
Perks Company, LLC in 2001; he was its registered agent, and managed it. (R., Vol. II, 
p. 224). Tabor had also formed Central Park, LLC, was the registered agent, and 
managed it. (R., Vol. 11, p. 228). Tabor filed Central Park's annual reports between 
2007-2012 (R., Vol. II, pp. 230 - 234 ); it is unclear who filed the 2013 report. (R. Vol. II, 
p. 227). 
Interestingly, during his April 26, 2013, deposition, Tabor, asked whether he had 
been "a member or a manager or a partner or where you had formed yourself or been 
part of a group that formed an LLC," answered, "I don't think so." (R., Vol. II, p. 213 (Tr. 
p. 31, L. 25 through p. 32, L.5)). This answer appears to be inconsistent with the Perks 
and Central Park secretary of state documents. Tabor was asked whether he ran one or 
two other LLCs. He answered, "At least one other." He gave the name as MNT. (R., Vol. 
II, p. 213 (Tr. p. 32, L. 6 through p. 33, L. 1)). Tabor was asked whether he had been 
either a member or manager in any LLCs other than MNT and A 1. He answered, "I can't 
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recall any others, no." (R., Vol. II, p. 213 (Tr. p. 33, Lns. 2-5)). At the time of the answer, 
he was the registered agent, member-manager, and a person who formed Central Park 
LLC. 
Also during deposition, Tabor was asked whether he had spoken to his partner 
about the June 8, 2007 dissolutions of A 1. He said no, even though they were on 
speaking terms. (R., Vol. II, pp. 220, 221 (Tr. p. 96, L. 3 through p. 99, L. 1)). Tabor's 
responses are interesting because by 2007 /2008 he was an experienced LLC manager. 
He would have known that administrative dissolution has a serious effect for an LLC, as 
it "continues its existence but may not carry on any business except that necessary to 
I wind up and liquidate its business and affairs ... " 
I Tabor was asked about the 2007 replacement note. He speculated that he 
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I ' ,,., 
"imagined" he discussed with his partner what should be done [since they could not pay 
off the Note]. (R., Vol. II, p. 220 (Tr. p. 94, L. 25 through p. 95, L. 3)). He claimed to 
have no idea why he chose December 27 [sic], 2007 as the due date, (R., Vol. II, p. 220 
(Tr. p. 95, Lns. 4 - 10)). the same reason given regarding why he did not renew it for a 
year. (R., Vol. II, p. 220 (Tr. p. 95, Lns. 11 - 13).) Tabor was asked whether he had "any 
realistic hope of' repaying the Note. He answered yes. When asked what that realistic 
hope was based on; his response is interesting, "I'm just an optimistic person, hoping I 
can turn it around." (R., Vol. II, p. 220 (Tr. p. 95, Lns. 14 - 24)). He did not have a plan, 
he did not identify a source of funds, he did not identify a surety, a bank account, or a 
property that was going to be sold at a profit. So he was asked what he saw in the 




















market that gave him hope; his answer, "There is always hope." (R., Vol. II, p. 220 (Tr. 
p. 95, L. 25 through p. 96, L. 2)). He could give no reasons for his claimed hope. 
The significance of this recital is to show that Tabor was an experienced LLC 
member-manager. He knew enough about LLCs to participate in their formation, and 
their dissolution. He likely knew that the law required a dissolved LLC to "wind up." 
"A limited liability company is dissolved and its affairs shall 
be wound up upon ... "[a]dministrative dissolution" 
I. C. § 53-642. (Emphasis added). As a member/manager of A1, when it was dissolved, 
Tabor was obliged to follow Idaho's LLC laws and "wind up" its affairs. I. C. § 53-642. 
The "winding up," unless the operating agreement provides differently, is governed by I. 
C. § 53-644. If Tabor had followed the law, once A 1 was wound up, its assets were 
required to be distributed, 
Upon the winding up of a limited liability company, the assets 
shall be distributed as follows: 
(1) Payment, or adequate provision for payment, shall be 
made to creditors ... 
(2) ... to members or former members in satisfaction of 
liabilities ... ; and 
(3) Unless otherwise provided ... to members and former 
members ... 
I. C. § 53-646. (Emphasis added.) The priority implied by the statute is that creditors are 
to be paid before members. 
In this case Tabor failed to act with good faith when he failed to wind up A1. 
Winding up meant that he had to pay A 1 's creditors or make provisions for their 




















payment. He did not even tell Marjorie that A 1 had been dissolved in spite of his regular 
contact with her during 2008 and 2009. (R., Vol. II, p. 191 (,r13)). Until this lawsuit, 
[Marjorie] was never told or notified that as a creditor, she needed to make a claim 
against A 1. (R., Vol. II, p. 191 (1114)). 
Tabor claims that they did not wind up the business because of debt- implying 
that A1 did not have assets for its creditors (R., Vol. II, p. 216 (Tr. p. 64, L. 18 through p. 
65, L. 4)). This claim appears inconsistent with documents provided showing Tabor and 
his partner loaned money and took distributions after the Note was due. 
Tabor, as a manager, could have made sure that the money went to Marjorie in a 
good faith attempt to fulfill his obligations. Instead, the money was loaned to Jeff 
Gardner after a time when the $150,000 Note had been in default. Tabor shows that he 
was not conducting his obligations as an A 1 manager towards Marjorie, in good faith. 
The argument is similar regarding the distributions that Tabor took and allowed 
his partner to take after the Note was in default. The tax documents show that the two 
managers received distributions of $150,967 in 2008. (R., Vol. II, p. 199 (,r7) and pp. 
202-210). Even accepting the statements of the accountant as true (R., Vol. 11, pp. 255, 
256.), Mr. Tabor and his partner took $109,649.00 from A1's assets when the Note was 
in default. (Tabor's cash, $35,754.00; Turner's cash, $24,078.00 and Turner's property, 
$49,817.) With the other facts, allowing the transfers demonstrate Mr. Tabor's lack of 
good faith and fair dealing with Marjorie and the debt. 















There is a factual issue where a jury could find that Mr. Tabor violated the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and should be individually responsible for 
repayment of the Note(s). 
3. Count Ill - Promissory Note. There Is A Factual Issue Whether Tabor 
Incurred Liability Under Partially Disclosed Principal Doctrine 
It is undisputed that A1 Real Estate failed to pay the Note for $150,000.00. 
Therefore, the District Court erred in dismissing Count Ill as it applies to A 1 Real Estate. 
The District Court also erred when it dismissed Count Ill against Tabor for the reasons 
discussed under agent/principal liability. 
The district court dismissed Marjorie's claims on the ground that the promissory 
note was clearly entered into between A 1 Real Estate & Martha and is unambiguous; 
and "there is no evidence that Martha was misled in any way." 
The court's determination that there is no evidence that Martha was misled in 
anyway is clearly erroneous. First, the summary judgment standard requires the court to 
weigh the facts in favor of the non-moving party. Marjorie's affidavit shows that Martha 
was misled. Another material fact is whether the Note is secured - the purchase and 
sale agreement say that it is, the closing documents say that it is not, and the Note is 
silent. However, Marjorie's main allegation is that Tabor breached his duties as an 
agent of A 1, and based on the breach he is responsible to repay the note. 
Underlying Marjorie's allegations and arguments are the principles that govern an 
agent who acts on behalf of another entity. At the time Tabor convinced Martha to loan 






















him $150,000, he was a member-manager and therefore A1's agent. I. C. § 53-616. 
Tabor was responsible to make sure the people with whom he was contracting knew 
that he was acting for a limited liability company. Because he did not clearly inform 
Martha or Marjorie that he was representing A 1 and that A 1 was a separate entity and a 
limited liability company, he is liable as a principal to the contract. 
Agent-principal liability principles are not new. It is well-established that an agent, 
in order to avoid personal liability, must, at the time of contracting, disclose both the 
capacity in which he acts and the existence and identity of his principal. Polk v. 
Haworth, 95 N.E. 332, 333 (1911). The managing officer of a corporation, even though 
acting for the company, becomes liable as a principal where he deals with one ignorant 
of the company's existence and of his relation to it and fails to inform the latter of the 
facts. Marco Distributing, Inc. v. Biehl, 97 Idaho 853, 858 (1976); McCluskey 
Commissary, Inc. v. Sullivan, 96 Idaho 91, 93 (1974) It is a basic principle that an agent 
who enters into a contract on behalf of a corporation, but who neither discloses his 
agency nor the existence of the corporation to the third party, becomes personally liable 
to that third party. McCluskey Commissary, Inc., supra at 93; and Inter/ode 
Constructors, Inc. v. Bryant, 132 Idaho 443 (Ct.App.1999). Even though there is no 
Idaho case law on the matter, agent liability principles should apply to limited liability 
companies. Corporations and LLCs receive similar liability limiting protections from the 
government and both are separate entities from their owners: stockholders and 




















members. An unscrupulous person could use either one to incur liabilities and harm 
unsuspecting people. 
The defendant agents in McCluskey incurred agent liability and were made 
principals to a contract because they failed to disclose that they represented a 
corporation, when they arranged for McCluskey to provide meat to a restaurant. They 
led McCluskey to believe they had an interest in the restaurant. One of the defendants 
told McCluskey that "we are opening a new restaurant," referring to himself and the 
other defendant. The meat was paid for in cash or charged to an account. The account 
contained the name of one of the individuals and the restaurant, "The Shah." Checks 
used to pay for the account were "The Shah" checks: they were signed by one of the 
defendants. Eventually they got behind on the account and McCluskey filed a collection 
suit against the defendants. They defended the suit saying that the restaurant was 
owned by a corporation. McCluskey had found out about the corporation after some of 
the account charges had occurred. The district court found that there had been no 
disclosure of the corporation to McCluskey until a demand was made on the account; 
and that McCluskey had prior good relationship with the defendants and was led to 
believe that The Shah was a partnership or joint venture. This Court affirmed. 
The situation between Tabor and Marjorie is similar. After Tabor had received the 
loan in 2005, he referred to the loan as his, and his responsibility until the summer of 
2009. During this time, Tabor never told Marjorie that it was not his loan to repay. 
Similarly, at least one of the McCluskey defendants told McCluskey that things were fine 




















"as long as I can get you" paid off, and "we owe you boys some money." There are 
some differences between the McCluskey defendants and Tabor. The McCluskey 
defendants had purchased meat from McCluskey in the past for another business. The 
relationship between Martha, Marjorie and Tabor was fairly short. But, in a short time 
the relationship had transformed into a friendship where Martha and Marjorie trusted 
Tabor to look out for their interests and they believed he had done so.4 The McCluskey 
plaintiffs and defendants both had ran businesses and were likely fairly sophisticated. 
Tabor shared that degree of sophistication with the McCluskey parties; he operated his 
own business and formed two and managed four LLCs. Martha and Marjorie were not 
sophisticated. Also, a difference here is that the purchase and sale agreement and the 
Note partially identify A 15 as the borrower. But, these documents contain no explanation 
of the significance of the name. While Tabor knew the significance of the LLC and how 
to sign the documents to try to avoid personal liability, he did not tell Martha and 
Marjorie. Situations like this, where the principal is partially disclosed, can shift liability to 
the agent. 
In the typical "partially disclosed principal" case, the person in Marjorie's position 
knows that there is a principal, but does not know who it is. Even though Martha and 
Marjorie were on notice that A1 was the borrower on the Note, Tabor is still liable under 
4 See facts argued in the Oral Contract argument. 
5 Notably, on the documents, the bottom of the "L" is hard to read. An elderly person 
could simply see I I C instead of LLC. However seeing the letters and knowing their 
significance are two separate things. 




















the partially disclosed principal theory. Keller Lorenz Co. v. Insurance Assoc. Corp., 98 
Idaho 678 (1977) (the plaintiff knew the defendant was acting as agent for some 
principal, but did not know which principal); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 4(2) 
(1957)). In the situation of a partially disclosed principal, the agent is party to the 
contract as a principal and liable under it. Restatement (Second) of Agency§ 321 
(1957). Under these principles, Tabor is a party to the note. 
The corporate liability protections will not protect corporate agents where a 
principal is only partially disclosed. In Western Seeds, Inc. v. Bartu, 109 Idaho 70 
(Ct.App.1985), Western Seeds knew that it was dealing with the Farmer's Feed and 
Seed, Inc. through its agent Bartu; but Bartu did not tell Western Seeds that Farmer's 
Feed was owned by his company, Pocatello Cold Storage Inc. This Court held that 
Bartu's partial disclosure of the principal was insufficient to relieve him from liability on 
the debt owed to Western Seeds. The same analysis should apply to LLCs even though 
there are no Idaho cases. LLC members and officers have been held personally liable 
under circumstances that include misrepresentation. See, Ledy v. Wilson, 831 N.Y.S.2d 
61 (N.Y. AD. 1 Dept. 2007) (recognizing potential personal liability of officers for LLC's 
breach of contract if officers acted on LLC's behalf and breach involved bad faith 
misrepresentations); and Water, Waste & Land, Inc. v. Lanham, 955 P.2d 997 
(Colo.1998). (Two member/managers held personally liable on a contract under the 
common law partially disclosed principal doctrine. The LLC was identified only as P.1.1., 
but there was no indication of what P.1.1. meant or that it was a LLC. The court rejected 










the argument that the constructive notice provisions of the Colorado LLC Act protected 
the defendants since they had failed to adequately identify the LLC principal). 
Here Tabor asked for a loan for he and his partner, without identifying any 
business by name, or explaining the business structure. (R., Vol. II, p. 189 (1f7)). The 
business name was first identified at the closing of the McCall sale, but it did not cause 
Marjorie to consider that the loan was to an entity separate from Mr. Tabor. (R., Vol. 11, 
p. 188 (1J4)). Marjorie did not know that A1 was a LLC until this case was filed; (R., Vol. 
II, p. 139 (1f1f9 and 11) and p. 187 (1f2) and p. 188 (1f4) and p. 192 (1f16)). To her, A1's 
LLC designation meant nothing. She was not knowledgeable enough to know that LLC 
was the equivalent of INC. or CORP. for liability purposes. Marjorie could have better 
advised Martha had Tabor been forthright. At the least she would have insisted Martha 
maintain an interest in the property until the loans were paid. (R., Vol. II, p. 192 (1l16)). 
I Count Ill of the Complaint incorporates by reference all of the facts alleged in 
I paragraphs 1 through 46 and adds four more paragraphs. The pleadings put Tabor on 









tried. Marjorie has presented sufficient facts to establish a factual dispute. 
4. Summary Judgment Was Improperly Granted On Count IV, The 
Uniust Enrichment Claim, Where Genuine Issues Of Material Fact 
Exist Regarding Whether Tabor Received A Benefit. 
The District Court's reasoning in this section its Order is rather vague, confusing, 
and inaccurate in places. Its appears to read that because the debt to Martha first 
became due, and then the LLC was administratively dissolved when it was insolvent 




















and had no assets to distribute, then it could not follow the statutory requirements for 
dissolution under I.C. § [53-646]. (R., Vol. II, pp. 297-298). The Court also appears to 
be misinformed, because its Order states that A1 was administrative dissolved "for 
failure to file necessary reports, it failed to file those reports because it was insolvent." 
(R., Vol. II, p. 298). To clarify, A 1 was administratively dissolved because it did not file 
its annual report on time or within the sixty day grace period, not because it was 
insolvent. I.C. §§ 53-613 and 53-643B. Finally, the Order's concluding paragraph, after 
leads the reader down the road towards a ruling in favor of Tabor, then the Court 
changed gears and stated "[p]laintiff is likewise entitled to summary judgment on Count 
IV of the complaint."6 (R., Vol. II, p. 298). 
What Counsel for Marjorie guesses is implied by the District Court's ruling on the 
unjust enrichment claim is that where the LLC had no assets, it was not guilty of 
inequitable retention of a benefit that required its return. Nonetheless, counsel 
respectfully disagrees; it seems the District Court failed to construe the facts here in a 
light most favorable to Marjorie. 
Marjorie is pursuing multiple claims, one of which is breach of contract, and she 
can only sustain her claim for unjust enrichment if the Court finds that here is not an 
express contract covering the same subject matter, or if the Court finds that there is, but 
that the contract is unenforceable. See, Thomas v. Thomas, 150 Idaho 636, (2011 ); 
see Wolford v. Tankersly, 107 Idaho 1062, 1064 (1984). Thus, Marjorie reserves her 
6 Counsel wistfully confesses that he harbors no illusions regarding the Court's intent. 




















claim of unjust enrichment as an the alternative to a finding that there is an enforceable 
contract. 
A prima facie case of unjust enrichment consists of three elements: (1) there was 
a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant 
of such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that would be 
inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff for the 
value thereof. Brewer v. Washington Rsa No. 8 Ltd., 145 Idaho 735 (2008) (quoting 
Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 88 (1999). The most 
significant requirement for a recovery on quasi contract is that the enrichment to the 
defendant be unjust. See, Idaho Lumber Inc. v. Buck, 109 Idaho 737, 745 (Ct. App. 
1985). 
In this case, Marjorie alleged that Tabor received, on behalf of A 1, a sum certain 
of $150,000 as evidenced by the Note. (R., Vol. I, p. 41). Rather than foreclosing on 
the Note, Marjorie worked with Tabor to find solutions and alternatives to payment. 
Tabor benefitted because he was the able to continue the LLC business, to pay himself 
and his partner from the company's payroll, and to pay off himself as a creditor of A 1. 
Despite the District Court's conclusion that A 1 was insolvent when it was 
administratively dissolved, Tabor has not made that claim. Moreover, the 2008 tax 
records (R., Vol. II, pp. 202-210), the letter from CPA Gregory Braun (R., Vol. II, pp. 
255-256), and Tabor's own admissions provide sufficient evidence to raise a genuine 
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issue of material fact as to what funds were available to the LLC to pay back even a 
portion of what it owed to its creditors. (R., Vol. II, pp. 249-250). 
Marjorie admits that the monetary benefit received by Tabor and the LLC had its 
origins in Martha's pocketbook and possibly could then be traced to the LLC's bank 
account; however, but for Marjorie and Tabor, it is likely that the loan would never have 
made, or that it would have been foreclosed on upon its default. Tabor admitted that he 
went to Martha for the loan because he was unlikely to receive such a large, unsecured 
loan from a bank. (R., Vol. II, p. 217). Tabor further admitted that Marjorie was the one 
with whom he had most of the discussions and with whom he conducted negotiations 
and renewal of the Note (R., Vol. II, p. 216, Tabor Deposition p. 63 L. 8-16, p. 218, 
Tabor Deposition p. 89 L. 10-22); and she was the one he was able to persuade 
postponement of foreclosure or a lawsuit- to her detriment (R., Vol. II, p. 261). 
Tabor, who was a member-manager of the LLC, and who had a friendship with 
Marjorie, was in the best position to see that creditors were paid off before making non-
business loans and making distributions to himself and his business partner. It would 
be inequitable to allow him to further retain money that was loaned to him and expected 
to have been returned many years ago. Because there is a genuine dispute of fact 
regarding the benefit and to whom it inured, tied into who was the recipient of the loan, 
and the District Court did not draw the inferences in Marjorie's favor, the Court erred in 
granting summary judgment on Count IV. 




















C. Marjorie is Entitled to Attorney Fees and Costs Because Tabor's 
Motion To Dismiss and Motion For Summary Judgment Are Without 
Foundation. 
This Court is authorized to award reasonable attorneys to the prevailing party. 
I.AR. 41, I. C. § 12-121. In a civil action to recover on a note, the prevailing party shall 
be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee. I. C. § 12-120. The Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure permit an award only when the court finds, from the facts presented to it, that 
the case was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without 
foundation. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1 ). 
In addition to Marjorie's statutory right, the Note provides a contractual right to 
attorney fees for claims brought in its enforcement (R., Vol. I, p. 41 ), thus, should 
Marjorie prevail, she is entitled to an award of attorney fees. 
Finally, the District Court concluded its order granting Tabor summary judgment 
on all counts, with the statement that the plaintiff argued other theories of relief during 
the summary judgment hearing, but failed to provide relevant authority and failed to 
plead the theories in the complaint. The court did not identify these theories. "A 
complaint need only contain a concise statement of the facts constituting the cause of 
action and a demand for relief." Clark v. Olsen, 11 O Idaho 323, 325 (1986). The Idaho 
Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of this rule is, in part, to allow the best 
chance for each claim to be determined on its merits rather than on some procedural 
technicality. Id. cited in Hoots. 























For the reasons stated above, the December 27, 2013 decision of the District 
Court granting summary judgment to Tabor, and, in turn, dismissing Marjorie's 
Complaint, should be reversed, and Marjorie should be awarded her costs and attorney 
fees on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS _··_Z_,,_.f:=,,···_)_ day of July, 2014 
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Attorney at Law 
Kenneth F. Stringfield 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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